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If time travel to our location is possible, we do not live in a branching universe 
This paper argues for the following disjunction: either we do not live in a world with a 
branching temporal structure, or backwards time travel1 is nomologically impossible, 
given the initial state of the universe, or backwards time travel to our space-time location 
is impossible given large-scale facts about space and time. A fortiori, if backwards time 
travel to our location is possible, we do not live in a branching universe. 
Horwich (1987:1) gestures towards an interesting argument for the conclusion that there 
is no backwards time travel in the actual world. For, if there is some future time, t, at 
which the requisite technology is developed and subsequently used, we would expect to 
see, around here, time travellers originating from t. We see no such time travellers, and 
thus there is no actual time travel.2 Call this (following Smith, 2016) the ‘where are the 
time travellers?’ argument. Fulmer (1980) articulates, but declines to endorse, the same 
style of argument. Reinganum (1986) argues in a similar vein that if there is actual time 
travel then greedy time travellers would seek enormous wealth (by investing money, 
travelling forward to collect their capital and interest, and repeating this process at their 
whim). As the havoc this would wreak on our financial system has not ensued, 
Reinganum concludes that time travel “has never existed and furthermore never will 
exist” (1986:10). 
The ‘where are the time travellers?’ argument is unconvincing. There are two broad 
reasons why we might see no time travellers, despite there being actual time travel. The 
first concerns contingent features of the travellers themselves. Perhaps they have visited, 
and we have simply not noticed, either because they chose to remain covert or because 
we have been insufficiently attentive (see Smith, 1997; Fulmer, 1980). Perhaps they have 
simply not chosen to visit us, for our little corner of space-time is mundane in 
comparison to the time travel tourist hotspots. Perhaps time travel is a very costly 
undertaking, and time travellers must be very judicious in their use of it. The second 
concerns large-scale facts about space and time that might prevent time travellers from 
                                                
1 When I talk of backwards time travel, I have in mind the interesting kind, where future individuals can 
travel back and interact with past individuals. 
2 “If the necessary technology will ever become available, why haven't we encountered visitors from the 
future?” (1987:1). In chapter 7 of the same volume, Horwich presents his better-known argument against 
time travel: namely, that backwards time travel would result in “an endless string of improbable 
coincidences” (1987:123). This latter argument is given a thorough treatment in Smith (1997), and is not 
my focus here. Likewise, while Hawking (1992:610) notes that “[t]here is also strong experimental evidence 
in favor of the conjecture [that there is no actual time travel] from the fact that we have not been invaded 
by hordes of tourists from the future”, his primary argument—that there is no actual time travel due to the 
nomological impossibility of closed time-like curves—is not my focus. 
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visiting us. For example, it could be that time travel to our location has not occurred 
because we are not near to the exit of a naturally existing wormhole, and we have not 
created such a wormhole (Smith, 2016). In other words, it could be that the earliest 
destination to which one can time travel is after the time at which we exist. 
While my primary focus is the first type of response, let’s take a moment to consider the 
second. This explanation of the lack of observed time travellers derives from 
contemporary models of how backwards time travel might work—see, e.g., Morris, 
Thorne and Yurtsever (1988)—which typically suggest that a time traveller would take a 
‘shortcut’ between two space-time locations, via a wormhole. There are three ways to 
understand how this might work. It could be that: 
(a) The only nomologically possible way to time travel is to harness a naturally 
occurring wormhole that connects two space-time locations. 
(b) It is nomologically possible to create (or make traversable) a wormhole in the 
present, which would allow future time travellers to visit us, but not allow travel 
before its creation.3 
(c) It is nomologically possible to create (or make traversable) a wormhole in the 
present, through which one could travel to the past. 
If (a) or (b) is the case, then the ‘where are the time travellers?’ argument can be 
dismissed by pointing out that there are no naturally occurring wormhole exits near us, 
and that we have not created a wormhole from which future time travellers can emerge. 
In my conclusion, this case is captured by the disjunct that ‘backwards time travel to our 
space-time location is impossible given large-scale facts about space and time’.4  
If (c) is the case, and wormholes can be created between the traveller’s location and a past 
destination, then there would still need to be a wormhole near us in order for time 
travellers to arrive. However, we cannot explain the lack of such a wormhole purely in 
terms of contingent large-scale facts about space and time, or our own failure to create 
one. That there is no traversable wormhole near us is, in part, due to the fact that no 
                                                
3 Davies (2007) notes that “[p]ossibly space is threaded with such structures naturally--relics of the big 
bang. If so, a supercivilization might commandeer one. Alternatively, wormholes might naturally come into 
existence on tiny scales, the so-called Planck length, about 20 factors of 10 as small as an atomic nucleus. 
In principle, such a minute wormhole could be stabilized by a pulse of energy and then somehow inflated 
to usable dimensions.” 
4 That’s because one large-scale fact about space and time concerns whether or not there is a wormhole 
exit near us, be it naturally occurring or artificial. 
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future time travellers have created one. Moreover, as I argue below, if we live in a 
branching universe and (c) is the case, future time travellers would create and 
conspicuously emerge from a wormhole near us.5 As this is not occurring, I conclude that 
if (c) is the case, we do not live in a branching universe.6  
Thus, it is primarily the possibility of (c) that motivates my discussion of the first type of 
response to the ‘where are the time travellers?’ argument. (c) has been given little 
attention in the existing literature, but, as far as I am aware, this is not due to any knock-
down argument against it. As worlds with time travel are worlds with backwards 
causation, on what basis can we rule out that a wormhole in the present might be caused 
to exist by some future time travellers? In any case, no matter which of (a), (b) or (c) is 
true, if backwards time travel to our location is possible, we do not live in a branching 
universe. 
I will now argue that the first type of response, that appeals to contingent features of the 
time travellers, is implausible in the context of the ‘branching universe’ ontological 
picture, whereby every way that things could go, given the way things are and the laws of 
nature, is the case on some branch or other.7 First, let’s consider the purely B-theoretic 
incarnation of the view, according to which the entire branching structure exists 
unchangingly, like the eternalist’s four-dimensional block. The model is intended to 
capture the openness of the future, and is often motivated as the natural way to 
understand the ontology implicit in the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
The latter motivation lends the view scientific credibility: perhaps the branching universe 
is not merely a metaphysician’s fantasy, but an empirically respectable hypothesis. For 
discussion of this version see, inter alia, Thomason (1970), Belnap (1992), Farr (2012) and 
Wilson (manuscript). 
Even if there are limitations on the branches that are accessible via time travel in a 
branching universe, if we live in such a universe it cannot be that we see no time 
                                                
5 Whether there is in fact a local exit from a traversable wormhole is a difficult issue, and one beyond the 
scope of this paper. Wormholes are, in principle, detectable. Indeed, they are detectable with current 
technology. Nevertheless, detecting very small wormholes remains very difficult. Since it is unclear how 
large a wormhole would need to be in order to be traversable it is, in turn, unclear whether it would be easy 
for us to detect traversable wormholes. Thus, it seems premature to conclude that there are no exits from 
traversable wormholes near us (though it is clear that, if there are such wormholes, they are not being 
conspicuously traversed!). 
6 A corollary of this is that if we live in a branching universe, and time travel is nomologically possible 
given the initial conditions, it works in the way outlined by option (a) or (b). 
7 Notably, this rejoinder is not available to Horwich, who discusses the branching universe but dismisses it 
as unmotivated (1987:25-33). 
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travellers merely in virtue of contingent features of the time travellers themselves. To see 
this, suppose that one can only time travel between two points if there is a direct path 
between those points (where a direct path is one that only runs forwards or backwards in 
time; a path that runs back along one branch, and then forward along another is not a 
direct path).8 Nonetheless, looking forward from our location, there is a lot of future from 
which time travellers could originate. Moreover, that future is very diverse. Just as the 
branching structure includes every nomologically possible way things could go, 
compatible with the initial conditions of the universe, the branching structure in our 
future includes every nomologically possible way things could go, given the way things 
are now (including, on the quantum version of the branching universe, all the possible 
but vanishingly unlikely quantum events. See Wilson, (manuscript §1.8) for a discussion 
of the plenitude of the quantum many-worlds). 
So, if time travel is nomologically possible and compatible with the current state of the 
world, there are many—perhaps even infinitely many—branches in our future where 
time travel technology is developed and used.9 Likewise, there will be, amongst these 
branches, branches where the inhabitants are motivated to travel back and visit our little 
corner of space-time (not merely to visit 2017—there will be many 2017s within the 
branching structure—but to visit our 2017). Amongst these many branches containing 
time travellers itching to visit us, there will be many branches where these individuals are 
also wild exhibitionists who, upon arriving at our time, intend to present an enormous 
fanfare to make very sure that we are aware of their arrival. Finally, amongst these 
branches there will be branches populated by individuals with one eye, two eyes, three 
eyes, and so on… As all of these things are nomologically possible, they are all out there 
in the enormous future branching structure. 
Given the existence of all these future branches, we can’t simply be unlucky enough to 
inhabit a world with only shy time travellers, or time travellers uninterested in us: a 
branching universe where there is time travel will contain the multiplicity of branches I 
                                                
8 The argument that follows is equally effective if we suppose there to be no such limitations on the 
accessibility relations between branches. I mention these limitations only to show that the argument 
requires no potentially objectionable assumptions about the possible routes via which time travel might 
occur in a branching universe. 
9 There will be many such branches unless for some reason time travel is so sensitive that it requires, say, a 
kind of quantum event that can only occur given the conditions that obtain on one branch, but not the 
nearby branches distinct from it in tiny ways—such as the decaying of atoms at the (spatially) distant end 
of the universe. But why should we think time travel, if possible, is sensitive in this way? Plausibly, if there 
is time travel anywhere in the branching structure, there is time travel in many places, including in our 
future. 
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described above, exhibitionists and all! Thus, there will be many—perhaps infinitely 
many—beings who have access to time travel technology, desire to visit us, and are 
intent on putting on a show when they do so. So, if we live in a branching universe, and 
time travel is nomologically possible given the initial conditions, and there are no large-
scale facts about space-time that prevent time travel to our location, we should not 
merely expect some evidence of time travellers—we should expect to be inundated by 
them! There should be one-eyed exhibitionists, two-eyed exhibitionists, three-eyed 
exhibitionists, and so on.10 
Let’s now briefly consider the A-theoretic branching universe model, due to McCall 
(1994).11 According to this view, the objective present ‘moves through’ the branching 
structure, such that at each fork only one future path is ‘chosen’, and the others ‘drop 
off’.12 As argued by Miller (2005) in the context of a different argument against time 
travel in an A-theoretic branching universe, if a time traveller arrives from a future 
branch which subsequently drops off, that individual should no longer be considered a 
time traveller, for a necessary condition on being a (backwards) time traveller is to be 
caused by some future event.13 If Miller is right, and if time travel to here is 
nomologically possible, given the initial conditions of the universe and large-scale facts 
about space-time, we should expect to be inundated by folk who appear to be time 
travellers. However, unless the branches from which they originate are on the path taken 
by the objectively present moment, there will, bizarrely, be no actual time travel. 
Ultimately, whether these individuals deserve to be called time travellers need not 
concern us here. As a matter of fact, we are experiencing no such inundation, and thus 
the arguments of the previous paragraph apply equally to the A-theoretic branching 
universe model. 
In sum, if we inhabit a branching universe, the first style of response to the ‘where are 
the time travellers?’ argument is implausible. Thus, we arrive at the disjunction with 
                                                
10 A referee wondered what to say about personal identity in the case where we are inundated by time 
travelling continuers of ourselves. The natural response is to say that this is a case of massive fission, where 
the products of fission then travel back. So one’s preferred story about personal identity in the case of 
fission can be imported to make sense of what’s happening.  
11 The following argument is only required on the supposition that Keller and Nelson (2001), Daniels 
(2012) and Hall (2014) are right that the A-theory is compatible with time travel. If it turns out that, given 
the A-theoretic picture, there are independent grounds to think that time travel (or perhaps backwards 
causation, more generally) is impossible or incoherent, the arguments that follow are superfluous. Either 
way, the disjunctive conclusion holds. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
12 Alternatively, one might think of the A-theoretic version of the view as one where there is an objectively 
present moment that moves through the atemporally existing four-dimensional structure. The same 
arguments apply to this view as to the purely B-theoretic view. 
13 See Martínez (2011) for the view that they never were time travellers. 
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which we started the paper: either we do not live in a world with a branching temporal 
structure, or backwards time travel is nomologically impossible, given the initial state of 
the universe, or backwards time travel to our location is impossible given large-scale facts 
about space and time (such as the lack of a wormhole exit near us). It follows that if 
backwards time travel to our location is possible, we do not live in a branching universe. 
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